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SUMMARY
In recent years, several Colombian scholars have studied this country’s civil confl ict through the lenses of  economic 
reasoning and state-of-the-art statistical testing. Their analyses place most of  the explanatory burden of  the confl ict 
on the existence of  lootable resources and organized crime, not on any specifi c socio-economic factor of  Colombia’s 
reality (“objective causes”). This paper criticizes their claims while accepting their criteria and methods. In particular, 
it contends that their formal approach to civil confl icts is fl awed, a fl aw that carries over to the type of  empirical 
tests conducted and that there are several gaps in the reasoning from statistical results to the overall interpretation 
of  the confl ict. 
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UNA CRÍTICA A LAS TEORÍAS “BASADAS EN LOS RECURSOS” SOBRE 
LA GUERRA CIVIL EN COLOMBIA
RESUMEN
En los últimos años, varios académicos colombianos han estudiado el confl icto civil de este país a través de la lente 
del razonamiento económico y el examen estadístico de punta. Sus análisis ubican la mayor parte de la carga 
explicativa del confl icto en la existencia de recursos saqueables y crimen organizado, en vez de atribuirla a cualquier 
otro factor socioeconómico de la realidad colombiana (“causas objetivas”). Este trabajo critica sus posiciones aunque 
acepta sus criterios y métodos. En particular, sostiene que su enfoque formal hacia los confl ictos civiles es impreciso, 
imprecisión que se debe al tipo de exámenes empíricos.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Hegel famously likened philosophical refl ection to Minerva’s owl, soaring at dusk. With this he 
meant that full, reasoned understanding of  historical processes was only possible once they were over. 
Of  course, Hegel is excused for not having Colombia in mind, a country that was barely born by the 
time of  his death. Otherwise, it might have occurred to him that, whatever truth his remark may hold, 
intellectuals, those epitomes of  human curiosity, could hardly wait to analyze a civil war whose “dusk” 
is still yet to arrive, even 40 years after it began. Colombia’s civil war may go down in history as one of  
the best documented and diagnosed civil confl icts in record. This is no cause for celebration, but a sad 
comment on the country’s ordeal: the war has been so long and painful that it has given Colombia’s 
intellectuals the reasons and the time to measure, study and discuss it with the professionalism inte-
llectuals in other latitudes reserve for historical events. 
Not only the war has been long enough to be analyzed as it unfolds, it has been long enough to see 
intellectual orthodoxies rise and fall, not a mean feat of  endurance when we consider the examples of  
other intellectual orthodoxies such as keynesianism and monetarism. The last decade has witnessed 
the rise of  a new orthodoxy among academics, one that is purported to refute and displace the “ob-
jective-causes” theory launched in the 80’s by a set of  social scientists convened by the government to 
study the civil confl ict. The new orthodoxy has not yet been christened with any catchy name but, in 
the interest of  brevity, and for reasons that will become apparent, I will call it here the “supply-side” 
theory of  the civil war. 
While these academic exercises make a valuable contribution to our democratic disagreements, 
they can never take its place: hence the danger of  orthodoxies. The supply-side theory is acquiring the 
undeserved status of  a fact, putting down other perspectives that were encompassed in the objective-
causes school. Left unchecked, the supply side theory is likely to cross the line that separates analysis 
from dogma, theory from political weapon. 
This paper offers a polemic against the supply-side views on Colombia’s civil war. It is by no means 
the fi rst, or the most comprehensive polemic. My more modest goal is to offer an internal criticism 
of  the supply-side school, a criticism that accepts this school’s conceptual foundations and standards 
of  relevance but that disagrees with its conduct of  the analysis, the conclusions it reaches and the 
implications it draws. In the interest of  coherence, I will proceed “downstream,” that is, I will discuss 
fi rst the theory, then the data and then the recommendations. After offering a brief  history of  the 
emergence of  the supply-side paradigm in Colombia (Section 2), I will claim that its analytical foun-
dations are shaky as a result of  an incorrect formal treatment of  the problem of  civil wars (Section 3). 
Then, I will argue that the empirical tests that supply-siders have offered remain inconclusive and are 
consistent with many other interpretations of  the confl ict (Section 4). While up to that point of  the 
argument I accept the criteria for empirical testing offered by supply-siders, in Section 5 I will ques-
tion the relevance of  such criteria. Section 6 takes issue with the policy implications that supply-siders 
draw from their analysis, arguing that they are, for the most part a nonsequitur. Section 7 summarizes 
and offers some concluding remarks. 
2.  THE RISE OF “SUPPLY-SIDE” EXPLANATIONS 
What is often referred to as the objective-causes school is rather a large, not necessarily cohesive, 
body of  scholarship that fl ourished during the 60’s and 70’sin Colombia and that came of  age with the 
famous “violentologist’s report” (offi cially known as the report of  the Comisión de Estudios Sobre la Violencia) 
of  1987. In spite of  a large diversity within members of  this school, they shared the belief  that the ulti-
mate causes of  Colombia’s guerrilla struggle was to be found in a set of  social pathologies, be they eco-
nomic inequality, social exclusion, political constraints, etc. Since, presumably, these pathologies were 
objective, that is, not a fi gment of  the guerrillas’ imagination, such belief  earned this school its name. 
Although its recent critics label it as an orthodoxy, perhaps to underscore their own combativeness, 
the objective-causes school, in spite of  its prominence and the serious intellectual work of  its propo-
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nents, was anything but. At the time, the orthodox position, the one that carried the day in shaping 
policy, was, as we shall see, closer to the “new” supply-side theory: the offi cial language up until the 
early 80’s would refer to guerrilla fi ghters as “bandits,” “thugs” and “agents of  foreign doctrines” 
wasting no time in any discussion of  the putative objective causes. It was only in the 80’s, once the 
notion of  a peace settlement with the guerrillas gained enough legitimacy to become a deliberate 
government policy, and even then at great political cost for the Administration, that the objective-cau-
ses theory acquired currency outside the rarefi ed environment of  the academia. In a telling sign of  
the political moment, the same set of  ideas that had previously given intellectual ammunition to the 
opposition groups, was now enlisted to give a veneer of  academic respectability to the government’s 
decisions. 
It was to be a short-lived achievement. For starters, by the time the commission reported, the heady 
days of  Betancur’s peace process were over. From the denouement of  Betancur’s peace talks the Bar-
co Administration concluded that the body politic was not ready for high-profi le, all-encompassing, 
negotiations with the guerrilla, lead-ing to and accompanied by grandiose reform schemes. Whatever 
one believes about the strategy pursued by the Barco Administration, its peace policy hardly seemed 
a brain-child of  the commission. This is much more true of  the Gaviria Administration, where some 
prominent supply-siders held important posts. For all its fl aws the “objective causes” school can fairly 
be exonerated of  one of  the charges supply-siders level against it: prolonging the confl ict through a 
misguided diagnose. The commission never had the impact over policy that would make it liable to 
such a charge. 
After its brief  political apex passed, the objective-causes school became the target of  academic 
attacks from different scholars that, only for convenience, I group here under the rubric of  supply-
siders. In spite of  some differences among themselves, they shared several characteristics. Whereas 
the objective-causes scholars were usually sociologists, historians or political scientists, trained in Con-
tinental traditions (French or German), and working in public universities, supply-siders were eco-
nomists, trained in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and working in private universities. As such, they em-
phasized the rigor of  formal reasoning as the source of  theoretical propositions and of  econometric 
techniques as the standard to test them. 
Operating within this mindframe, they established some fi ndings that, in their view, defi nitively 
refuted the objective-causes school: 
1.  Only a small fraction (between 6 and 12%) of  the variance in homicides across municipalities 
in Colombia is explained by socio-economic conditions. (Sánchez and Nuñez, 2001). 
2.  The time-series of  homicides in Colombia does not track the time series of  in-equality, poverty, 
social exclusion or any other “objective cause.” Periods of  im-provement in social indicators are often 
accompanied by periods of  increase in homicides.(Montenegro and Posada, 2001). 
3.  It is not the poorest regions of  the country the ones affl icted by the highest homi-cide rate, but 
instead those municipalities with brisk economic growth. (Mon-tenegro and Posada, 1995). 
4.  “Lootable” resources are one of  the best explanatory variables for the location of  irregular ar-
mies. (Montenegro and Posada, 2001). 
5.  Poor “state capacity,” especially of  the judiciary and law-enforcement branches, is highly corre-
lated with high homicide rates. (Rubio, 1997). 
These fi ndings led supply-siders to conclude that violence in Colombia was not the result of  some genera-
lized socio-political malaise, but rather of  organized crime. As drug barons acquired their formidable force in 
the 80’s, so the argument goes, their criminal activities fueled Colombia’s confl ict through several mechanisms. 
First, they fi nanced handsomely both guerrillas and paramilitary groups. Second, they overbur-dened an al-
ready weak law-enforcement apparatus, rendering it unable to check the irregular armies. Third, they created 
areas of  the country awash in “lootable resources” thus giving the incentives for these same irregular armies 
to capture the surplus. 
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In their diagnosis, supply-siders focus on the resource base that turns factions in a civil confl ict into viable 
armies, affording a tiny role, or none at all, to the circumstances that could presumably lead individuals to want 
to confront the State in the fi rst place. This emphasis on the supply of  resources needed for rebellion warrants, 
I think, the label of  “supply-siders.” 
As if  the econometric evidence were not enough, supply-siders can count on other confi rming evidence 
to support their views. No one questions, for instance, that the FARC controls today substantial parts of  the 
coca-producing complex in Colombia and that it extorts vast resources from both citizens (through kidnaping) 
and the State (through crafty schemes of  intimidation and corrupt bargains with municipal councils). (Rubio, 
2002). 
Much of  the intellectual support for supply-siders comes from state-of-the-art schol-arship in the area of  
civil wars. Collier (2000) redefi ned the fi eld by criticizing the “grievance-based” theories and tilting the balance 
in favor of  the “greed-based” the-ories. In his analysis, the notion that social grievances lead to civil wars is 
logically fl awed and empirically invalidated. It is logically fl awed because any connection be-tween a grievance 
and the decision to act on it is blocked by the free-rider problem. Would-be rebels fi nd that grievance redress is 
a public good and prefer to let the bur-den fall on others. It is empirically invalidated because grievances have 
poor predictive power in explaining civil wars1.
Instead, since any insurgent group needs resources to survive as a challenger to the state, the access to re-
sources is better at explaining the existence of  insurgency. Hence the title of  Collier’s paper: “Rebellion as a 
Quasi-criminal Activity.”
Likewise, Fearon and Laitin (2003) have concluded that grievances have little ex-planatory power but, unlike 
Collier, place the emphasis more on “state capacity” rather than on the existence of  lootable resources. At any 
rate, both lines of  study coincide in some objective factors that make countries more vulnerable to insurgencies, 
being “rough terrain” a prominent one among them.
This set of  assertions led many supply-siders to conclude that, instead of  trying to reach a political settle-
ment with irregular armies that are more interested in their own purse than in that of  the poor they claim to 
represent, Colombia should try to reestablish the rule of  law, focusing its resources in the judiciary and the 
military. Clearly, in recent years supply-side theories have accomplished something the objective-causes school 
could only dream about: see their analyses quoted, often verbatim by government offi cials and their conclusions 
elevated to the status of  offi cial policy.
Although far from complete, this summary describes the three main components of  the supply-side school: 
a. a theoretical model of  rebellions, b. aset of  empirical tests based on the observable behavior of  irregular 
armies and c. aset of  policy prescriptions. In what follows, I will discuss each of  these components in this same 
order.
3.  INSURGENCIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Although he is in the venerable company of  Olson (1965) and Tullock (1971), Collier is wrong in his argu-
ment about free-riding. Grievance-redress is not a public good. One of  the key properties of  a public good, 
often overlooked by the followers of  Olson’s collective-action theory, is that it could be provided by one agent, 
if  only he had all the resources available. Private shipping companies may build a lighthouse even if  the re-
sult benefi ts other companies. Grievance-redress is not like that. Redressing a grievance requires institutional 
change, something no individual can provide unilaterally. If  a citizen has a grievance against, say, the property 
rights of  another individual over a piece of  land, no effort of  his part, no matter how much resources he has 
will be enough to unilaterally change such property right. He can violate it, for sure, through forced eviction. 
But, unless a sizable group, at least the relevant members of  the com-munity, join him in repudiating such 
property right, it will stand. A property right is a right because it results from a special coordination of  beliefs 
among members of  a society.
1  In a separate, but related piece, I criticize at length Collier’s formal analysis and strategy for empirical testing. (See Medina (2005).)
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In a way, Collier has it backwards. It is not that rebellion is a quasi-criminal activity (the title of  his now 
classic paper), but that crime is a quasi-rebellious activity. The criminal, unable to create the political facts 
that will tilt the institutional balance in his favor, which is what the rebel does, is reduced to unilateral action, 
always risking the punishment reserved for those who contravene, without transforming, the recognized laws 
of  a polity.
This conceptual confusion carries over to the choice of  analytical tools and, from there, to fl awed empiri-
cal tests. As Taylor (1987) has pointed out, collective action is not a public-goods problem; it is not a situation 
where an individual’s optimal choices are independent of  those of  other actors. Collective action situations 
resemble coordination games with multiple equilibria, as opposed to “Prisoners’ Dilemmas” that only have 
unique equilibrium (and a dominance-solvable one at that)2.
This seemingly arcane point about the number of  equilibria in a game has several profound implications for 
the theory’s empirical tests. By defi nition, a model with multiple equilibria generates many possible outcomes. 
Thus, when we test its predictions empirically, we must be prepared to fi nd weak statistical correlations. In other 
words, the data may seem to suggest that we should reject the model, even though the model is, in fact, correct. 
An example from economics may be useful to illustrate this problem. 
Consider a textbook market for a simple commodity, corn. Under the standard assumptions of  supply and 
demand, there will be a unique price-quantity equilibrium for this market. If  we believe that different eco-
nomies, call them “cities,” face the same supply and demand functions, we can collect the data of  prices and 
quantities and test their correlation with other exogenous variables. For instance, since we know that wheat is 
a substitute of  corn we can conjecture that when wheat becomes cheaper, say because of  an unusually large 
harvest, this will depress the demand for corn and, with it, its price. This is a testable conjecture and, if  our 
assumptions are right, we are likely to see that in a cross-sectional analysis, cities with abundant wheat will have 
cheap corn, and cities with scarce wheat will have expensive corn. 
But now imagine that, through some freak of  economic laws, the market for corn has multiple equilibria. 
Although rare in simple markets such as that of  corn, multiple equilibria can arise in many other contexts, 
economic and political. For simplicity, assume that there are only two possible equilibria, one with low prices 
and one with high prices. Any city, regardless of  the size of  its wheat harvest, can be in one of  these equilibria, 
depending on the specifi cs of  its “equilibrium-selection” process. It would now become possible to observe very 
expensive corn in cities with large wheat reserves and cheap corn in cities that hardly produce any wheat: the 
cross-sectional estimates would display no correlation, or a very weak one, between wheat harvests and corn 
prices. In that context, supply-siders would rightly refrain from concluding that economic theory is wrong and 
that there is no connection between the price of  a good and the availability of  its substitutes. They would, 
instead, look for different testing procedures. For instance, we could still pick up a connection between wheat 
harvests and corn prices if  we looked at the time-series estimates for each city, instead of  bundling all the data 
in one single analysis3. After all, the existence of  multiple equilibria means that, in a way, each city is unique 
and that it makes little sense to try to prove or disprove highly general theories comparing these inherently 
different cases. 
Likewise, the collective action problems behind grievance-redress have multiple equilibria. As such, we are 
unlikely to fi nd impressive cross-sectional correlations between grievances and civil war even if  grievances cause 
civil wars, in much the same way as large wheat harvests cause low corn prices. Notice that I am not saying 
that this proves grievance-based models. I am simply saying that poor cross-sectional correlations do not refute 
them. 
2 The technical, game-theoretic details of  this argument are not essential for the general reader. I have dealt extensively with them, 
however, in my book Medina (2004).
3 In fact, this is akin to the recent fi nding of  Trejo (2004) in his study of  the Zapatista insurgency. Whereas socio-economic conditions 
do not show up signifi cantly in cross-sectional analysis as explanations for levels of  confl ict, they have a clear effect in time-series 
analysis, within each locality.
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Intuitively, there is no reason to believe that there is a cross-sectional “law” linking grievances and confl icts. 
Supply-siders in Colombia keep pointing out that Colombia’s socio-economic indicators are not as bad as those 
of  other countries in the region that do not have guerrillas (Ecuador being an oft-quoted example). Certainly 
this is an interesting observation but has little value as proof  of  anything. In particular, it does not refute a 
grievance-based explanation of  Colombia’s confl ict. There might be many reasons that lead Colombians to 
revolt at situations that Ecuadorans accept placidly; that is each country’s problem. Colombian peasants are 
under not more of  an obligation than Ecuadorans to conform to laws of  social sciences when deciding what to 
do about their plight. 
4.  THE TREACHEROUS ROAD FROM ANALYSIS TO TESTS 
The logical confusion between public-goods and coordination games may not be that far-reaching 
because supply-siders have resorted to other types of  arguments and empirical tests. In this section I 
turn to some of  those tests devised by supply-siders to evaluate the arguments from believers in the ob-
jective-causes. For the most part, they are deeply fl awed but the objective-causes school deserves some 
blame for this. With a hostile view of  the type of  empirical testing common in economics, scholars of  
the objective-causes school never spelled out their theories’ testable implications in terms economists 
could recognize. Whether they should have done so or not, depends on one’s views on the value of  eco-
nometric testing. But if  I launch a theory and then neglect to tell my potential critics what they should 
expect from it, how they should test it and what should and should not count as evidence for it, I have 
no right to cry foul if  those same critics design their own tests, in their own terms. Drawing from their 
training as economists, supply-siders have designed tests for the objective-causes theory that consistent-
ly refute it. Those tests, however, are uninformative because they do not speak to the major issues raised 
by the objective-causes school. I will not claim that my views on the matter represent the “true” theory 
of  objective causes: this is, after all, a school known for its internal diversity. What I will claim is that 
there are reasonable statements that establish a connection between Colombia’s socioeconomic condi-
tions and its confl ict and that these statements have not been refuted by the tests of  supply-siders. 
Even if  we grant that cross-sectional analysis across countries is uninformative, supply-siders could 
argue, the objective-causes theory has also been refuted by the time-series analysis. Furthermore, one 
still has to deal with arguments about cross-sectional analysis within the same country. As mentioned 
above, homicides in Colombia have increased in periods in which poverty, inequality, social spending 
and political inclusion have decreased (Montenegro and Posada, 2001) and, across municipalities, 
display weak, even perverse correlations with socioeconomic conditions. 
There is something inadequate about this fi xation with homicide rates. Doubtless, people are get-
ting killed in Colombia at appalling rates and any contribution social sciences can make to ameliorate 
this is welcome. But if  the point is to analyze the confl ict between the government and the irregular 
armies, homicides only constitute a small part of  the picture. Let’s not forget that only a small fraction 
of  all the homicides in Colombia are directly linked (albeit a tricky defi nitional exercise) to the armed 
confl ict. Guerrilla groups everywhere murder people, to be sure, but that is not all they do. They also 
procure resources, try to control the local politics of  many areas, precisely to avoid having to resort 
so much to murder and even try to win “hearts and minds.” It is a well-established regularity of  civil 
wars (e.g. Kalyvas (2004)) that areas fi rmly under the control of  an army tend to be the safest ones. 
If  right now the FARC were engaged in a wildly successful propaganda campaign, attracting under-
ground sympathizers by the thousands, all of  them willing to risk their lives for the FARC, most of  us, 
including supply-siders, would consider this to be an increase in the intensity of  the confl ict. But the 
homicide charts would not help us to articulate our concerns. 
Taken out of  context, the data on homicides are useless as indicators of  the confl ict. The objective-
causes school could be right under many possible scenarios, all of  them compatible with these data. 
One could imagine that, as a response to the courageous struggle of  selfl ess romantics, Colombia’s go-
vernment decided to put an end to most of  the country’s injustices, only to see those romantics being 
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slaughtered by the paramilitary. Alternatively, one could imagine that, under the impetus of  a benign, 
reformist government, Colombia’s social indicators improved vastly during the 70’s and 80’sand so, 
the population withdrew support from the guerrillas who then turned to more violent tactics. Who is 
killing whom, when, where, why? Regression analyses are silent to such subtleties. 
Not only homicides may be the wrong variable to look at in assessing the evolution of  the confl ict, 
the fi ndings about them are far less impressive than what supply-siders claim. For example, Sánchez 
and Núñez (2001) establish that only 6% of  the variance in homicide rates across municipalities is ex-
plained by socio-economic conditions. But then they add, somewhat anticlimactically, that almost all 
the remaining variance, more than 90%, is explained by the presence of  guerrillas or paramilitaries. 
It is hard to know what to make out of  this fi nding. If  we interpret this to mean that socio-economic 
conditions do not explain violence, then we have to conclude that habits of  sexual behavior and drug-
consumption do not explain AIDS because all of  the variance in AIDS is accounted for by the pre-
sence of  the HIV virus in the subjects’ bloodstream. The academic production of  the objective-causes 
school has been so large that I am acquainted with only a tiny fraction of  it. But I would be astonished 
if  any of  its members ever suggested that inequality could kill people by itself, without the intervention 
of  any human agent, be it a guerrilla or paramilitary fi ghter. This is an instance of  a test that does not 
prove anything because it fails to capture the essence of  the argument it was meant to test. 
Intra-country, cross-sectional analysis is another instance of  such reckless testing, also motivated by 
the unfortunate focus on homicide rates. The poorest municipalities may not be the country’s most 
violent, granted. But the objective-cause diagnosis never ruled this out. Conceivably, the poorest mu-
nicipalities could not be very violent be-cause they are already overwhelmingly supporting the FARC 
which enjoys a monopoly that allows it not to resort to murder. Even if  this is incorrect, and I believe 
it largely is, the idea that a group must operate only where its constituency is located is crass. Charita-
ble organizations such as the Salvation Army routinely deploy their members in affl uent parts of  the 
city, precisely because there is where the money is. Agricultural lobbies locate their headquarters in 
their country’s capital, as close as possible to Congress, because that is the most strategic location to 
further their goals. Armed insurgencies need resources; in that Collier is right. Whatever their goals, 
constituency and audience, smart armed groups will invest heavily in resource-rich areas.
The results on lootable resources are no more airtight. Colombia seems at fi rst glance a poster-
child for the lootable-resources theory of  civil wars, that is, the notion that the ultimate cause of  an in-
surgency is that the existence of  such resources gives incentives and opportunities to irregular armies. 
Homicide rates in Colombia track nicely, both in terms of  time-series and cross-sections, the presence 
of  rents from the coca trade, oil, cattle growing and other such activities. 
But it is not clear what makes a resource “lootable.” Illegal drugs and diamonds are often adduced 
as the quintessential example. But if  there is something inherent to these commodities that makes 
them lootable, it is hard to understand why they stop being so once they reach the US territory. Every 
day millions of  dollars worth of  diamonds and cocaine, the latter without enjoying any protection 
from the law, cross the US from coast to coast, often through very rough terrain, and no guerrilla has 
tried to predate them. (To be sure, the cocaine trade in the US generates high homicide rates, but no 
insurgency whatsoever.) 
One could refi ne the theory to say that resources are not lootable by virtue of  some physical pro-
perty but by the fact that they can be funneled into illegal activities. But then the theory looses all its 
explanatory power because, by defi nition, the moment some resource enters the accounts of  a gue-
rrilla group, it has been illegally used. The FARC could set a very profi table real-estate operation in 
Manhattan and funnel its profi ts to purchase arms, not unlike what reportedly, Ossama Bin Laden 
did when he used revenue from his family’s construction concerns to jump-start Al-Qaeda. To remain 
consistent with the theory, we would have to consider real-estate as another lootable resource. In that 
case, it would no longer make sense to talk about countries with abundant lootable resources and 
others without them; there would only be countries with large GDP and small GDP. 
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A variant of  the lootable-resource argument attributes the presence or absence of  looting to “state 
capacity.” According to this argument, weak states, unlike strong ones, cannot prevent predation of  
different resources. But it is hard to give a non-circular defi nition of  a weak state. If  the concept of  
state capacity is to serve as a key to explain rebellions, we must be able to ascertain the weakness of  a 
state without knowing if  it is challenged by rebels. Thus far, this has been an elusive task. How can we 
determine how strong would Colombia’s state be without the insurgency? 
All else been equal, rich guerrillas are more likely to grow and succeed than poor ones. This much is 
clear, and Colombia is a country where it has become relatively easy for guerrilla groups to amass vast 
resources. If, in light of  this, we jump to the conclusion that socioeconomic phenomena are not behind 
the operation of  these groups we must also be willing to tell an obese patient that, since she leads a 
sedentary lifestyle, her overeating has nothing to do with her problem. Supply-siders have a point: there 
are logistic, fi nancial and geographic circumstances that benefi t insurgent groups. No one disputes this, 
least of  all the insurgents themselves. But supply-siders are distinctive in their insistence that resources 
tell all the story, rarely entertaining the possibility that both supply and demand, resources and grievan-
ces, explain Colombia’s confl ict. It is hard to see what is the scientifi c purpose served by such single-
mindedness in studying a phenomenon that most likely results from very complex processes. 
5.  THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICISM 
Not only the empirical strategies designed by supply-siders to refute the objective-causes theories 
suffer several shortcomings, it is not even clear that data analysis alone can serve the purpose of  
understanding Colombia’s confl ict. I do not deny that empirical analysis, informed by econometric 
techniques, is a powerful tool in social sciences, but it is no substitute for conceptual analysis. 
Supply-siders have been very successful in getting across their view that the FARC are not a politi-
cally motivated group, but are instead a cartel dedicated to resource-extraction. This view, however, is 
not a conclusion of  their analysis; it is an assumption they make that cannot be proven by any amount 
of  regressions. 
If  anything, the quantitative patterns suggests that the FARC have a national political agenda, one 
that requires them to operate throughout all the country, to gather as much resources as possible to 
survive in the long haul. The FARC run a huge money-making operation. But this is not evidence that 
they do not have other goals. The best universities in the US have large endowments invested in many 
different sectors. For example, Stanford University owns the fancy Stanford Shopping Center and 
derives income as landlord of  those great beacons of  knowledge Nordstrom and Victoria’s Secret. No 
one would infer from this that Stanford is not interested in scientifi c research and that it has, instead, 
become an apparel business. I do not mean to compare the noble goals of  Stanford University with 
those of  the FARC, but one is left wondering why notions that are common-sensical in the study of  
legal organizations, elude the grasp of  supply-siders when they think about the FARC.
Money can corrupt organizations as much as it corrupts individuals. There are many reasons to 
believe that this is happening to the FARC. But, whatever those reasons are, they have nothing to do 
with the statistical correlations between homicides and rents. If  the FARC were pristine spokesmen for 
the poor, they would still be trying to get their hands at the many resources Colombia’s underground 
economy has to offer and, by necessity, this would put them at the center of  not a few homicides: that 
happens to any group, ideological or not, that deals in such business lines. 
Supply-siders give the impression of  hoping that some magic number will reveal the nature of  the 
problem; that some statistic, be it homicide rates or hectares of  coca holds the key to understand what 
Colombia’s ordeal is. But social phenomena are not only quantitative, part of  their essence is hidden 
behind the numbers. 
Nothing in the number of  people gathered in a public square, shouting jubilantly, tells us if  it is a 
political gathering or the celebration of  a glorious football victory. Nothing in the time-series of  ho-
micide rates in coca-growing towns in Colombia tells us if  they result from personal grouches, from 
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fi ghts over unreported coca income or from executions to silence informants of  the other side. Recent 
scholarship has established (Kalyvas, 2004) that much of  the violence that occurs in civil wars, not 
only in Colombia but elsewhere, is only tenuously related, if  at all, to grand, ideological motives. Still 
this does not mean that civil wars are just a bunch of  killings. It rather means that civil wars are very 
complex processes that, among many other things, allow unusual amounts of  killings to take place.
If  the data cannot tell us what is the nature of  the FARC, how can we know? I suggest we apply to 
this the same non-quantitative technique we would use to distinguish a political rally from a football 
celebration: read the signs. Once we lift our gaze from the data, we realize that there are many signs 
that the FARC are, indeed, a political group. 
It is very hard for an armed group not to be involved in politics. If  a group of  well-trained men 
hang around a village’s main square, toting machine guns, without anybody being able to challenge 
them, this is already a display of  military power that can easily become political power. Some locals 
will fear them, others may want seek them for “help” with their own confl icts, taking care of  trouble-
some neighbors, intimidating unruly workers or arrogant patrons. Such a group, even if  it does not 
espouse any particular ideology, is a force to be reckoned with in local politics. The Mafi a in Southern 
Italy has historically been a powerful armed group not known for issuing political statements of  any 
kind. But it is not possible to understand Southern Italian politics without its presence. It helped strea-
mline political machines thus tilting the balance in favor of  some parties at the expense of  others. Just 
the fact of  having guns, lots of  them, makes irregular armies political groups. 
It would take an especially thick set of  methodological blinders to ignore that Colombia’s politi-
cal landscape has been affected by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. We do not need regression 
analysis to conclude that the targeted killing of  more than 3000 activists of  one political party (the 
Patriotic Union), is the kind of  event that alters the balance of  all the political forces in the country, 
including those sectors who would have otherwise made coalitions with it. We will never know how 
would Colombia’s politics look now if  the Patriotic Union had been allowed to operate undisturbed. 
But it is certain that it would look very different. Those who have turned Colombia into the most 
dangerous place on Earth for trade-union leaders, know something that robust estimators cannot tell 
us: that the climate of  labor relations, the balance of  power between all the actors involved in them, 
depend on how many union leaders are killed, threatened or intimidated. Correlation tests over fi -
gures of  homicide do not inform us about the message each homicide of  a human rights activist, a 
school teacher, a municipal council member sends to other human rights activists, school teachers and 
municipal council members. 
Colombians are rightly appalled at the way the irregular armies have targeted civilians. But this 
is not a rarity. It is part of  what civil wars are. A civil war, especially if  it is political, is a war for the 
control of  the civilian population and few tools of  control match threats and assassinations. 
If  next week the FARC launch a military campaign that kills hundreds of  soldiers in the elite corps 
and leaves Bogota without access to the rest of  the country for three or four days, one could reaso-
nably predict that the price of  the dollar would shoot up as many Colombians scramble to acquire 
an easily movable asset. In fact, this already happened in 1999 at a much smaller scale than the one 
of  this imagined scenario. I can only think of  one explanation: most Colombians understand that, 
unlikely as it is, if  for some reason the FARC were to win the war and topple the government, the 
entire political, social and economic system of  the country would be shaken down to its roots; in other 
words, it would mean a revolutionary change. 
6.  FROM ‘IS ’TO ‘OUGHT’? 
Supply-side theories of  Colombia’s civil war are an analytical exercise, presumably with purely 
descriptive goals. But supply-siders have been prompt to draw policy conclusions from it. In that step, 
they no longer rely solely on economic theory but also on their own ideological conceptions. There 
is nothing wrong about this; social scientists always bring their own ideological views to bear on their 
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subjects of  study. But a healthy discussion of  these matters requires us to be clear on where analysis 
stops and judgment begins. 
Montenegro and Posada (2001) offer what appear to be a catalog of  the prescriptive implications 
supply-siders derive from their analysis. In resting their case, they spell out their conclusions while 
indicting the objective-causes school on several grounds. Although such indictment is not by itself  a 
set of  recommendations, it is well worth discussing because it sets the tone of  said recommendations 
and provides analytical clues to assess them. 
Their main accusation against the objective-causes school is that it has created a “guilt complex” 
in the government as it deals with the guerrilla, a complex that, they argue has several negative effects. 
First, it makes the guerrilla appear as legitimate in the eyes of  the government’s negotiators. Second, 
it makes the negotiations loose focus as they range into substantive reforms instead of  the specifi cs 
of  demobilization and legalization of  the guerrilla. Third, it creates the false illusion that the peace 
process is tasked with ushering in some type of  ideal society. Fourth, it undermines the morale of  the 
law enforcement community. 
There is no evidence of  such a guilt complex or of  any of  its alleged consequences. There is no 
evidence that Colombia’s law enforcement community believes in the objective-causes theory or has 
so much as allowed it to affect its own morale. I cannot recall a single instance of  a guerrilla fi ghter 
acquitted of  charges by a judge on grounds of  the objective-causes theory. Colombia has granted 
amnesties in the past. But there is a large difference between the discretionary actions of  a misguided, 
lenient judge and an amnesty that results from a political decision, processed through a sovereign 
Congress. In the latter case, which is the one Colombians are familiar with, there is no lapse in morale 
but simply a political redefi nition of  the confl ict, something that embattled democratic countries keep 
doing constantly. 
The objective-causes theory does not imply that a peace process must be an entire reconstruction 
of  society. To be sure, some of  its proponents might have believed that at some point, but it is not a 
logical consequence and, it is becoming increasingly clear to all Colombians that, however the confl ict 
is solved, the resulting society will be mired dealing with its problematic legacy: no “ideal” society will 
result from any peace process, regardless of  the confl ict’s causes. 
When they turn to the focus that peace negotiations should have, the accusations of  supply-siders 
lead into their own normative conclusions. Instead of  wide-ranging negotiations, that involve eco-
nomic, political and social issues, supply-siders would prefer negotiations circumscribed to bringing 
the guerrilla back into legal politics, or perhaps even no negotiation at all, which is the approach of  
Uribe’s Administration that, apparently counts with the endorsement of  several supply-siders. 
This is a respectable point of  view. A supply-sider could make, with impeccable logic, the following 
speech: “As a Colombian citizen, I do not want peace at any cost. I believe in the legitimacy of  my 
government and my Constitution and am not willing to compromise its core principles in negotiating 
with illegal armed groups. If  this requires the country to remain at war for many years to come, so be 
it. I prefer a horrifi c war than an ignoble peace.” 
The Colombian Constitution has many things worth fi ghting for. It is safe to surmise that most Co-
lombians consider their government, warts and all, more legitimate than any of  the irregular armies 
operating in the country and that those same Colombians would hate to see their basic democratic 
freedoms sacrifi ced for the sake of  some peace agreement. But beyond that point, supply-siders run 
into what seems to me a normative inconsistency. 
Colombia’s government derives whatever legitimacy it has in virtue of  being the result of  consti-
tutional and legal practices that command and deserve the consent of  most Colombians. These prin-
ciples cannot be easily enumerated, but some of  them are beyond dispute. For instance, Colombia’s 
Constitution establishes a representative government, with separation of  powers, with mechanisms 
to prevent abuses of  authority, with guarantees for dissenters, political rights for all citizens and so 
on. But, as is often the case, the more specifi c those principles and practices, the less we can attribute 
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to them the legitimacy of  the government and the Constitution. For example, my allegiance to the 
Constitution does not depend on its specifi c clauses regulating the Central Bank, or the transfers to 
municipalities. As far as I am concerned, if  the Constitutional Assembly of  1991 had decided on some 
other arrangement on these matters, or even had remained silent about them I would still regard this 
Constitution as “mine,” as worthy of  my support. Other aspects of  Colombia’s society are not neces-
sarily sources of  legitimacy, or at least not for many citizens. The Constitution says nothing about how 
to deal with settlers in the coca region, or what should be the pattern of  land tenure, or how should 
the country exploit its natural resources and even if  it did, few of  us would consider those rules as the 
pillars of  its legitimacy. Interestingly, supply-siders tend to be intransigent in specifi cs such as these 
but fl exible when entertaining the possibility of  demobilization and amnesty for the irregular armies, 
something that touches not less than the Penal Code. I fi nd it odd that while supply-siders often consi-
der fair game in a negotiation general legal and constitutional principles such as the Penal Code and 
the laws on political parties they regard economic issues as land tenure or settlers in the agricultural 
frontier as entirely off  limits. In the interest of  consistency, if  the former are negotiable, so should be 
the latter and if  the latter are non-negotiable, so should be the former. 
But, whatever the oddities of  this normative view, what matters for the present purposes is that, 
contrary to the claims of  supply-siders, it not the logical conclusion of  an empirical analysis. There 
is no connection between the causes of  an insurgency and the strategies to solve it. There is no logi-
cal reason to negotiate with a group because it has a grievance. Arguably, the Confederate States of  
America had a grievance against the North during the Civil War, whom they saw as infringing their 
rights as states. But this did not prevent the North from dealing with them through military means, all 
the way up until total defeat. Likewise, the FARC in the 60’s emerged, arguably, as the result of  some 
grievances over land tenure but this did not stop the Valencia Administration from bombing its hea-
dquarters. As citizens, we can conclude, if  we so decide, that the best way to deal with an insurgency 
is by force even if  it is motivated by a grievance. Maybe we do not fi nd its grievance legitimate, or we 
think that the solutions they want, and the only ones they will settle for, will be terribly ruinous for the 
rest of  society. The Israeli historian Benny Morris, for instance, documented several atrocities per-
petrated by the Israeli army against Palestinians in 1948 but he has become notorious for saying that 
they do not call for any redress and that, if  anything, Israel should have ethnically cleansed the West 
Bank at that point. He believes that Palestinians have an understandable grievance but, in his view, the 
price for addressing such grievance would be a transformation of  the State of  Israel such that he fi nds 
it unbearable. (Morris, 2004) The “ur-” supply-siders in the 60’s and 70’sin Colombia successfully 
urged the government to take a military stance against the guerrillas, not because they thought that 
Colombia was perfect, but because they believed that any concessions to the guerrilla would destroy 
the fabric of  all they held good and dear. 
By the same token, it is not true that “non-grievance” groups must always be dealt with by force. 
Controversial as it might have been, many Colombians in the early 90’sthought it was a good idea to 
offer concessions to Pablo Escobar, an actor that few would regard as the paladin of  the downtrodden. 
Colombians even made him a concession they would have not considered for the FARC: a constitu-
tional reform. As I write these lines, the Uribe Administration is engaged in a negotiation process with 
the paramilitary, a move that seems to count with vast opinion support. Once again, the paramilitary 
do not fi t the prototype of  a group with a grievance against the government. If  anything, they have 
always thought of  themselves as allies of  the government. 
Not only the facts dug out by supply-siders do not lend logical support to their recommendations, 
they are not even enough to make them more attractive. This is an echo of  a motive brought out 
forcefully by Goldberger (1979) in the econometric debates around hereditability of  IQ. Suppose, 
for instance, that 98% of  the variance in homicide rates across municipalities in Colombia could be 
explained by differences in terrain and that only 2% could be explained by, say, levels of  schooling. If  
Colombia’s government wanted to reduce homicide rates, a worthy goal in one of  the world leader’s 
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in this pathology, should it conclude that increased schooling is not worth it? To answer this ques-
tion, variance explained is a useless criterion. No policy can change rough terrain, whereas increased 
schooling can be cheap in a Third World country. In deciding policies, sensible governments look at 
the cost of  affecting a variable, not at its role in explaining variances in a regression. 
Few would doubt that Colombia has serious problems of  law-enforcement. With more and better-
trained judges and police forces, the country could capture and prosecute more criminals. But this does 
not immediately mean that the solution to the country’s woes is to increase spending on judges and 
policemen, without any type of  negotiation strategy with those involved in illegal activities. Resources 
are scarce. Imagine, for the sake of  argument, that some whimsical billionaire is willing to give huge 
amounts of  money to Colombia, at no charge but with two conditions. First it should be earmarked to 
the relocation of  peasants from the coca region into the country’s agricultural heartland. Second, Co-
lombia would loose those funds if  it increased its military budget beyond what it currently is. Should 
the country accept the gift? It is impossible to tell at this level of  generality. It would depend on how 
much money it is, how much land could be purchased with it, how many peasants could be brought 
back to the legal agriculture, and so on. But under some scenarios it would be worth it. It could reduce 
the burdens over Colombia’s law-enforcement community, thus bringing down homicide rates beyond 
what could be accomplished with whatever increase in the military budget the country can afford. 
Knowing the amount of  variance in crime explained by “state capacity” tells us nothing about the 
appropriate policy to reduce violence because it tells us nothing about relative costs and benefi ts. 
The pace of  any conceivable peace process does not depend on the diagnosis of  the confl ict’s root 
causes. Let’s take the example of  the negotiations during the Pastrana Administration. We now know 
they failed for a host of  complex reasons. Was the alleged guilt complex one of  them? Hardly. Imagine 
an alternative universe in which the government’s negotiation team had been entirely free of  any kind 
of  guilt complex (something that assumes, dubiously, that the real-life negotiation team was a bunch 
of  “objective-causers”). It is hard to see how this would have changed the situation for the better, how 
this would have led the FARC to lay down its arms, facing the prospect of  much reduced concessions 
from the government. It makes more sense to assume that, whatever the failings of  that peace process, 
they had much more to do with the political and military facts on the ground than with some hard-to-
pin feature buried in the psyche of  the members of  the Administration. 
No amount of  empirical analysis will tell us how to successfully solve the confl ict because the no-
tion of  success is political, not analytical. There are no peace processes that are analytically correct 
or incorrect but peace terms that are acceptable or un-acceptable. No matter what supply-siders say 
today about the “true” nature of  the confl ict, whatever will work, will work. 
The guilt complex argument assumes that legitimacy can be established or refuted by a set of  re-
gressions. Whatever legitimacy Colombia’s government has does not depend on the statistical eviden-
ce marshaled by supply-siders. To fi x ideas, imagine that tomorrow the government shuts down Con-
gress, establishes censure of  the media, fi res all the majors and dismisses all the municipal councils in 
the country and replaces them with military offi cers, arrests and condemns after a mock trial a dozen 
of  opponents and publicly executes them in Bogota’s Bolivar Square. This would have no statistical 
effect, not even over the homicide rates because the executions would not count as homicide. But I, for 
one, would seriously downgrade my views about the legitimacy of  the government and I can imagine 
a handful of  Colombians doing the same. The willingness of  Colombians to rally behind their gover-
nment, to endure the hardships of  civil war, to kill and die for the defense of  fundamental principles 
of  governance depends on their encounters with said government, on their perception of  how their 
society fosters their life, goals and dignity, not on a few statistics, whatever their R-squared index. 
Even the image of  “Colombia” concurring to negotiations with the FARC is misleading. In any 
peace process the parties involved show divisions. If  some day we have successful peace talks with the 
FARC, some Colombians will fi nd points of  convergence with some members of  the guerrilla. The 
“us” and “them” will become blurred; such is the nature of  peace talks, especially successful ones. Not 
A critique of “resource-based” theories of Colombia’s civil war Luis Fernando Medina
análisis político nº 62, Bogotá, enero-abril, 2008: págs. 44-57
[56]
only legitimacy is not purely quantitative, it is not even static, it is not even determined once and for 
all before any peace negotiations. 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The supply-side school has brought to the study of  Colombia’s confl ict the promise of  combining 
rigorous theory and systematic empirical testing to develop solutions to the country’s ordeal. It has 
been debatable from the start whether this combination of  ingredients is desirable or feasible when it 
comes to the study of  civil wars. In this paper I have stayed away from that debate; I have no princi-
pled objection against the use of  formal analysis or statistical methods. Instead, I have argued that, by 
their own criteria, supply-siders have not prosecuted their case convincingly. 
Much of  the theoretical basis of  the supply-side school consists of  a specifi c type of  rational-choice 
modeling of  civil wars that borrows from the public-goods approach to collective action problems. In 
spite of  its remarkable infl uence, this paradigm is not hegemonic within rational-choice theory; stra-
tegic models of  collective action in the spirit of  Thomas Schelling’s tipping games are a well-known 
alternative (Schelling, 1978; Wood, 2002). Furthermore, it is not even plausible; it misrepresents be-
yond recognition the fundamental coordination problems of  a rebellion. The resulting theory leads 
to unique, deterministic predictions, inadequate for the statistical study of  a phenomenon that, by 
its very nature, is fraught with the uncertainty of  multiple possible outcomes of  aggregate behavior. 
Arguably, the public-goods approach has advanced faster than others in developing formal models of  
insurgency, something that explains why empirically-minded scholars were so quick to embrace it. But 
advancing in the wrong direction is not necessarily progress. 
State-of-the-art econometric techniques are another trademark of  the supply-side school. But, if  
anything, the undeniable skill of  the statistical analyses in this body of  scholarship has been something 
of  a mixed blessing. By directing the attention of  researchers toward measurable quantities such as 
murder rates, this commitment to econometric testing has come at the expense of  an understanding 
of  the context for such quantities. Thus, while it may be that the data speak for themselves, they speak 
only about themselves: murder rates inform us only about murder rates, not about their political 
implications and how they fi t in the larger strategies of  all the parties involved in the war, hectares 
of  coca leaf  inform us only about the size of  illegal crops, not about the underlying social processes 
that create them, fi gures on prosecution inform us only about the judiciary’s case-load, not about the 
challenges and possibilities of  the institutional changes needed to tackle it. 
Supply-siders pride themselves in offering a clear diagnosis of  Colombia’s war, the better to ter-
minate it. Even if, contrary to my reservations, their diagnosis was correct, this medical analogy, a leit 
motiv of  supply-siders, does not carry over to the treatment stage. Although we may be tempted to 
believe that a civil war is a disease of  the body politic, it is unlike diseases in medicine in that its cure 
does not come from an external treatment; there is nothing external to society. The decision to ter-
minate war, be it by making peace or by fi ghting it till the bitter end, is a political decision that no set 
of  experts, however well-informed and well-meaning can take on behalf  of  a country. Any proposed 
“solution” to the confl ict makes sense only against the backdrop of  a political, not technical, defi nition 
of  what the confl ict is, what is negotiable and what is not. This is something that no statistical analysis, 
however impeccable it may be, can provide. 
As citizens, supply-siders have been articulate participants in Colombia’s public debate and repre-
sent widely held views about what ought to be done in the country. They deserve praise for expressing 
publicly and forcefully their ideas. But little of  value is accomplished when they present as inexorable 
results of  some hard data what are no more (and no less) than their own cherished ideological posi-
tions. Instead, we are all better served if  all sides of  the debate acknowledge clearly the limitations 
of  their methods and theories. After all, although in thinking about the confl ict, history did not give 
Colombian social scientists the luxury of  the hegelian owl, no one wants to be reduced to the role of  
the parrot, repeating mindlessly the words of  some master. 
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